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Supreme Court of the State of Utah
T. COLLINS JACKSON,
PlaivntiJff and Appellant,
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Case No.
KENDRICK HARWARD, BLAIN C.
CURTIS, HEBER CHRISTIANSON, McKAY LARSON, TEX R.
OLSEN, SPENCER OLIN,

9000

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
·The Defendants propounded interrogatories to the
Plaintiff (Tr. 13-16) requiring Plaintiff to state in detail
and with particularity the acts, omissions or conduct
of each of the Defendants upon which Plaintiff based his
cause of action (Tr. 13). To this the Plaintiff answered
that the Defendants, in concert with one another, "participated in the installation and operation of a television
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booster rebroadcasting station in contravention of the
laws of the State of Utah and of the Federal Government" (Tr. 20, 21).
The Plaintiff further admitted, in discovery proceedings, that (A) he has no license or permit from the F.C.C.
(Tr. 21) (B) he has no franchise from any county, city,
or other local authority ( Tr. 21) (C) he was in violation
of his contract with Telluride Power to carry his lines
(Tr. 21, 32, 33) (D) he was operating under an assumed
name without any registration thereof (Tr. 27) (E) he
is capturing a fugitive signal without paying any consideration therefor or participating in the production
thereof (Tr. 21).
At the hearing below the Plaintiff received, over
the objection of the Defendants, leave to amend his
answers to the interrogatories which he later did in an
apparently desperate attempt to fabricate a justiciable
issue upon which he could go to trial. (Tr. 44)

STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY GRANTED THE RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ..
A. 'THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING ALL ALLEGATIONS
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO RIGHT
WHI·CH MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY.
B. THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING THE ALLEGA'TIONS
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO DUTY
ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS
BEEN VIOLATED.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY GRANTED THE RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ..
A. 'THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING ALL ALLEGATIONS
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO RIGHT
WHI.CH MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY.
B. THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING THE ALLEGA'TIONS
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE 'TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO DUTY
ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS
BEEN VIOLA'TED.

The Respondents brought their Motion before the
Trial Court for a Summary Judgment within that spirit
of the Rules expressed in Barron and Holtzoff, Volume
3 Page 58 to the effect that
a Summary Judgment is intended to prevent
vexation and delay, improve the machinery of
justice, promote the expeditious disposition of
cases and avoid unnecessary trials.
The underlying basis of the Respondents' Motion is
that the elements of any cause of action, i.e. : a primary
right and a corresponding duty, are entirely both absent
from the claims of the Appellant. As stated in Volume
1 American Jurisprudence Page 418, Actions, Section 21 :
A cause of action arises out of an antecedent
primary right superior to that of the offending
party. It is axiomatic that there can be no wrong
without a corresponding right and no breach of
duty by one person without a corresponding right
belonging to some other person. The existence of
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a legal right is, accordingly, an essential element
of the cause of action, inasmuch as a Plaintiff
must recover on the strength of his own case instead of the weakness of the Defendant's case,
since it is his right, instead of the Defendant's
wrong doing, that is the basis of recovery.
This is the set of rules upon which these Respondents presented their Motion below and the Argument
is necessarily divided into two main headings:
A. THE ABSEN·CE OF A LEGAL PRIMARY
RIGHT IN THE PLAINTIFF
B. THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY LEGAL
DUTY ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS
A. The Plaintiff comes before this Court admitting
in the pleadings, in the Answers to the Interrogatories,
and Responses to the Demands for Admissions, that he
is deficient in all of the following particulars:
1. That he has no license or permit from the Federal Communication Commission or from any other
governmental or administrative body (TR 21).
2. That he has no franchise from Sevier County in
violation of Article XII. Section 8 of the l-;- tah Constitution and Section 17-5-39 UCA 1953 (TR 21).
3. That he has no franchise, license, or permit from
any 1nunicipality within Sevier County, in violation of
the smnP constitutional provision and Section 10-8-14
UCA 1953. (TR 22)
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4. That during all times material to these proceedings, he has been subject to a contract authorizing the
use of utility poles for carrying his line which provides
as a condition precedent that he must secure all local
franchises required by law. ( TR 21, 32, 33)
5. That at all times material to these proceedings
he has operated under an unregistered assumed name,
contrary to the provisions of Section 42-2-1 UCA 1953.
(TR 27)

6. That he has been capturing a fugitive television
signal without paying any consideration for or contributing to the production thereof. ('TR 21)
7. That he is "a receiver" rather than "a broadcaster" and as a receiver is attempting to "reap where
he has not sown" (See Volume 15 ALR 2d, Page 791).
(Tr. 21)
In justification of these facts, the Appellant has
stated variously that he does have a property right in
the fugitive signal although it has cost him nothing for
its production; that he can acquire franchises and rights
to use public easements, roads and highways by prescription and that at the time he installed his apparatus in
Sevier County he was requested to do so by its inhabitants.
The Appellant contends that since he is a "receiver"
rather than a "broadcaster" he is not subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission or any
other governmental or administrative body.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

In 20th Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. MassachUsetts Char~table Association and the other cases cited at
Pages 791 of 15 ALR 2d, it has been held unequivocally
that a "receiver" has no property right in a signal and
in fact may be enjoined from taking advantage of the
telecast of productions to permit members of the public
to view the program on the Defendant's television screen.
These cases manifestly and unanimously hold that there
can be no property right in a fugitive signal captured
by an interloper and thus they all defeat Plaintiff's argument that he has a right in a signal which he admits
he intercepts without paying therefor any consideration
but has nevertheless transmitted on to residents of Sevier
County for his own economic gain.
\Y e strongly urge upon the Court that for those

reasons alone the Plaintiff is vested with no legal primary right protectable by law and this action quite correctly was summarily dismissed.
However, the Appellant is lacking not only in this
particular, itself dispositive entirely of the Motion, but
should have had his proceeding dismissed as they were
below for the reason that there -was no duty on the part
of the Defendants to avoid any harm or injury, if in
fact any harm or injury occurred, to the Appellant.
B. THE NON EXISTENCE OF A DUTY ON
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS.
We maintain that the Defendants haYe not been, at
any t.imf' material to these proceedings or at any other
t imP. in violation of any State or Federal Law or Regu-
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lation. We maintain that these Defendants, under the
provisions of Chapter 22, Section 1, Laws of Utah 1957,
were required, upon a finding that adequate economical
and proper television could not be made available to
the public by ·private sources, to equip and maintain any
type of transmission or relay facilities that could bring
television to the inhabitants of Sevier County.
The District Court has heretofore held that the statute contemplates and provides a public purpose and
therefore is constitutional. An appeal taken from that
ruling by the Plaintiff has been dismissed. (See Supreme
Court of Utah No. 8902, Civil No. 4955 Sevier County).
The Plaintiff cannot contend that the type of facilities which are being operated by the Defendants are in
violation of any federal statute or any regulations in
view of C. J. Comm~mity Services v. Federal Communications Commission, 246 Federal 2d, Page 660, a 1958
case where it was held that the Federal Communications
Commission in the public interest, and when warranted
by circumstances indicating public necessity and the public welfare, had the discretion to permit operation of a
booster system. In that case the Court of Appeals for
the Circuit of the District of Columbia held :
"The Federal Communications Commission
says in effect that instead of serving the public
interest by making reception by "boosters" available it has no alternative whatever but the ouster
of the booster.
We think there is an alternative. The Commission's decision noted that "The Rules and
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standards do not now provide for the licens1
operation of such an installation" thus despite t:
Commission's clear duty to provide for the u
of such channels throughout the past 22 years
the Commission's life, it has failed to adopt rul
under which signals may be picked up, reinvigo
ated and made available to the residents of tl
town. We suggest therefore that the Cornmissi<
may well get on with the rule making proceedml
apparently contemplated as a means of filling
the service area of television stations. We say th:
the Commission acted mistakenly in its belief th:
it lacked discretion to withhold the issuance 1
a cease and desist order and that upon this po~
the Commission's order must be reversed.
This decision clearly holds that there is no violatic
either of a federal law or a federal regulation in t1
operation of a "booster" type apparatus. This holdii
would bring the type of installation being operated 1
the Defendants within the purview of Chapter 22 Lav
of 1957, wherein there is authorized among other typ1
of facilities any "that is authorized by law for purpo:
of supplying television to the people."
If these Defendants have not acted in contraventi<
of any federal, state, or administrative law. rule, ~
regulation then the Plaintiff's case n1ust fail for th:
rf'a~on alone since there is non-existence of any duty <
the l mrt of these Defendants to avoid injury to the Plai
tiff, even if it be assmned that he suffered injury whic
as wP have contended under sub-heading A, is also abser
Hoing one ~tPp further. howeYer, and assumii
(which wf' do not ad1nit) that there was a violation 1
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the rules of the Federal Communications Commission,
how can it be said that the establishment of a regulation
of that Commission can bestow upon a private individual
a civil remedy against an individual violating the same.
The extension of the principle allowing redress to a person injured by the violation of a criminal statute to embrace situations wherein an administrative body enacts
a regulation pursuant to a law would place an unreasonable and in fact absurd burden upon those individuals
who must deal with regulatory agencies. They would be
faced with the intolerable threat of having the laws
changed from day to day by individuals not subject to
recall by election or direct control from any source but
who could alternately bestow and take away a civil right
without going through the legislative process.
If the Plaintiff is claiming that a violation of a
federal regulation by these Defendants has given rise
to a cause of action in his favor the complete answer is
that creation of administrative rules and regulations do
not confer such a right.
Even were we to assume that the existence of administrative regulations confers upon those subject thereto a duty the breach of which gives rise to a civil action
in favor of an individual injured thereby, still the Plaintiff is remediless for the reasons expressed in Volume
50, American Jurisprudence 582, Statutes, Section 586,
where it is stated :
"The legislative intent to grant or withhold a
private right of action for the violation of the
statute, or the failure to perform a statutory duty,
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is determined primarily from the form or langu.
age of the statute. The nature of the evil sought
to be remedied and the purpose it was intended
to accomplish may also be taken into consideration; in this respect the general rule is that a
statute which does not purport to establish a civil
liability, but merely makes provisions to secure
~he safety or welfare of the public as an entity,
Is not subject to a construction establishing a
civil liability."
Certainly the adoption of any federal regulation
would have as its purpose the protection of the public
and not the protection of a trespasser who is intercepting
a signal as a mere volunteer. The nature of the evil
sought to be remedied is not the evil of competing or
scrambling for a fugitive signal. A statute does not purport to establish a civil liability where it is designed
merely to make provisions to secure the welfare of the
public. The purpose of any regulation of the Federal
Communications Commission designed to decrease interference in the channels is to protect the public or the
consu1ner and not to protect individuals who are not
licensed and who have no rights under or sanctioned by
the Con11nission, or by any other governmental regulatory agency.

By the srune token. eYen should the statute be said
to hnpose a duty upon these Defendants, the violation
of whieh duty would be actionable in the Courts, then the
Plaintiff cannot avail himself of that construction since
lw 18 not one of the class entitled to take advantage of
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the law. 50 Am. Jur. 582, Statutes Sec. 587, where it is
said:
"An action for the violation of a statutory
duty is maintainable by one who is of a class entitled to take advantage of the law intended to be
protected by the Statute and for the benefit of
whom the statute was enacted. Indeed even though
the violation of the statute is regarded as actionable, it is generally required that the injury be
done to one of the class designed to be protected
by the statute or for whose benefit the statute
was enacted and to whom a duty of compliance
with the statute is owed. It has also been stated
as a general rule that a statutory right of action
may be maintained only for the benefit of the
person specified in this statute:-.
The Federal Communications regulations are all,
where dealing with interdictions against interference,
aimed at prohibiting interference with the signal of other
licensees. The Plaintiff here admits in the interrogatories he has no such license, and as he stated in his oral
argument, he is not even a broadcastor and therefore
certainly not within the class of people entitled to benefit
by any rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission or laws creating that Commission.
The Plaintiff has alleged in his Complaint that all
these Defendants are officers of Sevier County and yet
in oral argument upon the motion, he has contended that
they are sued in their private capacity. This demonstrates
that the Plaintiff has finally realized that he is in an
• impossible dilemma in determining which course to pur-
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sue and that in either event he has no action against 1
Defendants.
First, if he sues these individuals alleging that
are public officials or acted as public officials in
conduct complained of in the complaint, then he is f:
squarely with the decision in Hjorth et al. vs. Wh~l
burg, 121 Utah 324, 241 Pac. 2d 907, wherein it is sta
It is the general rule of law that stat~
municipal officials performing a duty imp<
upon them by statute and exercising in good £
the judgment and discretion necessary there:
are not liable personally in damages for inju
to private individuals resulting as a conseqm
of their official act.
It must necessarily be as so held, othen
public officials would be fearful to act at the :
of finding themselves personan~~ liable for :
done in good faith in performance of their dut
On the other hand if the Plaintiff complains 1
these Defendants are acting individually and in com
to do him damage then he is faced mth the proposi1
that all of the provisions of the Ftah State Law, (wl
he argues prohibits the activity complained of) mus1
disregarded since all those principles and provisi
which the Plaintiff has cited and argued have been
gued by hiin as prohibiting only the activity of govE
1nental ageneies in the field of teleYision and televiE
rebroadcasting. The Defendants then would be equall~
entitled as the Plaintiff to attempt to intercept and
broadea~t or tran~mit an:- fugitiYe signals which t
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could capture from any source whatsoever and distribute
the same to all the residents of Sevier County. Plaintiff,
if he pursues this theory, must abandon all claim of a
violation of State Statutes.
It is clear, we submit, that the Defendants have violated neither a federal nor a state statute; that they have
done only that permitted by the law authorizing local
governments to furnish television to remotely situated
areas, and only that which Plaintiff has been doing for
several years.

The Plaintiff clearly is asking for freedom from
competition rather than freedom to compete with others.
It is his contention that his business has been destroyed
by attempts on the part of the D'efendants to provide
citizens of Sevier County with adequate, economical and
proper television and that their operation is in violation
of nebulous rules, regulations and statutes whereas he
is exempt, himself, from all of the same.

In short, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendants
have no legal right to do a thing which he has no legal
right to do himself.
We have searched the pleadings and proceedings
thoroughly in an attempt to discover any assertable right
which the Plaintiff has, and can find none. He has no
: affirmative interest in property but only the asserted
claim that the Defendants are doing something which
1
is interdicted by regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, yet the Community Service Case cited
above holds that even federal regulations have not been
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violated. He does not show that he affirmatively has
any right either to do the acts which he claims constituted
his business which was damaged or any interest which
may be protected in law or in which he may assert a
claim of property. His entire case is that the wealmess
of the Defendants' position entitles him to recover from
them. We have amply demonstrated, however, that the
position of the Defendants is not weak, but is in fact
based upon privileges on a parity with, or even superior
to, those of the Plaintiff.
The following are our observation concerning the
Brief of the Appellant:
The Appellant in his desperation to find a theory
upon which relief can be granted him has scatter-gunned
the entire field of tort law attempting to grasp upon some
cogent basis for obtaining relief and has claimed some
remedy under what he calls "six theories."
Examination of all six demonstrates that he has presupposed, without even arguing, that he has a primary
legal right which he can assert, and a property interest
which the law can protect.

'V e would be seriously imposing upon the Court's
tilne to reiterate the many reasons expressed above why
thP Plaintiff has neither an assertable right nor a propprf~· int(:'l'P~t. or the Defendants any lawful duty, for the
enforce1nent of which the Plaintiff may have recourse
to the Con rts ; nevertheless we think it proper to comInent hri('fly on those six theories which the Plaintiff
elaims prP~Pnt isslH's justiciable before this Court
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First, he states that this action is brought for a
trespass to the Plaintiff's property and business interests. We have demonstrated that the Plaintiff has neither
a business nor a property interest unless it can be said
that he is entitled to a Decree of this Court protecting
him against competition. As we stated previously, he is
a mere volunteer, intercepting a fugitive signal which
is not, as he states in his brief, "his signal," but is the
signal of the originator who could enjoin the Plaintiff
from rebroadcasting the same (15 ALR 2d 791).
Plaintiff secondly claims that the Defendants were
negligent. If the Plaintiff has no legal right or property
interest which can be protected by the courts it is immaterial whether or not a person acts negligently even
though some damage may result to the Plaintiff. There
must be a concurrence of a right, a duty, and a wrong
and without any one of those elements a cause of action
fails. Vol. 1 Am. Jur. 422, Action, Section 27.
The Plaintiff states that his third cause of action
involves a nuisance by reason of continuing trespasses.
If there are no trespasses there are no nuisances.
The Plaintiff claims that his fourth cause of action
proceeds on the theory that the Defendants have induced
the Plaintiff's customers to breach their contracts with
him. The complete answer to this contention is that the
Plaintiff, under any view of facts, has no right to contract
:with any persons because he has nothing to give them in
consideration for their promise to pay or their payment
to him of fees for his services.
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The Plaintiff's claim here can be likened to a person suing another for interfering with his contract to
sell the Brooklyn Bridge.
The Plaintiff states that his fifth cause of action
is for a conspiracy. In Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J.
S. 247, 123 A. 2d 30, 59 ALR 2d 1277 it is held:
"A conspiracy can not be made the subject of
a civil action unless something is done which,
without the conspiracy, would give a right of
action."
In Lewis v. Turner, 314 Pac. 2d 625, it is held:
"Where the facts and circumstances relied
upon to establish a conspiracy are as consistent
with a lawful or honest purpose as with an unlawful undertaking, they are insufficient."
In Beardsley v. Kilmer, 321 Xew York, N. Y. 80,
140 K. E. 203, a case controlling the facts in the issue at
bar, it was held that even though one object of persons
in establishing a newspaper in a city was to punish the
publisher of another newspaper for attacks made upon
them by such paper there is no right of action for conspiracy if some of the objects of the competing newspaper were to give the community a first class journal and
to protect themselves against the other newspaper by
driving it out of business.

II Prt:) there ct>rta inl~- was no intention to drive anyone out of business ; but assuming there were, no cause
of action would accrue.
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The Plaintiff asserts that his sixth cause of action
alleges malice in committing the torts which he claims
damaged the Plaintiff. Malice is, we admit, a question
of fact, but even if malice is proved there must be an
accompanying legal wrong otherwise there is no cause
of action. A person can do a thing maliciously and unless
his malice is accompanied by a legal "wrong" it is not
actionable per se. There is a very clear statement of this
principle found in Am. J ur. Vol. 1 p. 420, where it is
stated:
"A malicious motive or a mere intention to
do wrong, not connected with the infringement of
a legal right, can not be made the subject of a
civil action, for malice, of itself, as a state of
mind, is not a wrong for which the law gives redress. Accordingly it may be laid down as a general rule that a rightful or legal act or the exercise
of a legal right, is not rendered actionable as a
wrong to another by virtue of a bad intent with
which it was done or the existence of a malicious
motive that prompted it."
The rule is very clearly stated in an annotation in 54

Am. St. Rep. 886:
"Whatever a man has a legal right to do he
may do with impunity and without raising a cause
of action against himself because of bad motives
if he exercises his legal right in a legal way, eve~
though damage results to another."
Thus we have demonstrated, we submit, that the Plaintiff must show a "wrong" committed by the Defendants
in addit~on to showing that there is a right in the Plaintiff which can be protected. We submit that not only
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has he failed to show both but that he has failed to show
e~ther.

The Plaintiff, in the face of the holding in C. J.
Community Services v. F.C.C., 246 F 2d 660, nonetheless
claims that "boosters are still unlawful." The case holds
explicitly that the F.C.C. has absolute discretion to issue
or withhold a "cease and desist order" against a booster
television station and that each such case 1nust be
weighed upon its own merits considering public convenience, interest, and necessity, and that boosters as such
are not outlawed per se, but only when the Conmrission
finds that they in fact constitute, in the specific instance,
an intereference with other licensed comn1unications.
As amazing as it may sound, this is the "statutory violation" upon which Plaintiff bases his cause of action
against these Defendants.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that this Plaintiff has so
utterly failed to show any semblance of a cause of action
that these proceedings were properly dismissed in Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

KEN CHAMBERLAIN"
Attorney for Respondents
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